Commercial speech has been uniquely categorized in American law. In fact, this process of splitting speech into various categories has been a hallmark of American Constitutional jurisprudence. Pulling from both British common law and more modern doctrines, the Supreme Court has established a rather complex hierarchy of under-protected categories of speech. As a result, commercial speech has been subject to a much greater amount of regulation than its more-protected forms. This essay examines the doctrine’s foundation and also its future in light of more recent cases.

Our first inquiry is what is meant by the term “Commercial Speech”? The doctrine, as we are familiar with today, originated with Central Hudson v. Public service Commission of New York. The issue in this case was whether the state could constitutionally prohibit Central Hudson (an electric-company) from advertising the use of electricity in an attempt to curb energy usage. Much of the debate in revolved around the economic interests of the state of New York in maintaining the supply of electricity for its citizens. In order to protect supply (and by extension, the interests of the public at large), the city had created a restriction on Hudson’s ability to advertise energy use. The state’s economic interests were considered substantial enough to warrant the suppression of Central Hudson’s First Amendment protections.

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In this case, I concur with the majority in result, but would rather decide the case on less questionable grounds.

I concur with the majority on the issues of spectrum scarcity and licensing. It is clear that the F.C.C. must allocate frequencies if the broadcast media is to exist in the form in which we have become accustomed. The public nature of the airwaves necessitates a licensing scheme in order for the available frequencies to be allocated in a market competing for those frequencies. Furthermore, there is no compelling reason why government licensing of airwaves should be any different than its involvement in many other marketplace where resources are scarce. In fact, were it not for the failure of the private sector to divide up the broadcast spectrum, government regulation would not have been necessary. The right of any party to use the airwaves should be looked at with no more or less favor than the rights of someone to pollute a stream or river; government regulation is needed in both instances in order to allow the most people to have the most access.

In addressing the issues arising from technological advances in distribution and digital compression, the majority correctly reasoned that the mere lack of a current demand for every available frequency neither negates the possibility that those frequencies could be filled nor solves the problem of frequency allocation. Licensing is still required to prevent spectrum “overlap”, regardless of total availability. We are increasingly becoming a media-centric society; to assume that demand will never outpace supply is, in my opinion, shortsighted.

It is after this point that I disagree with the majority’s reasoning, and concur in outcome only. It seems clear that Red Lion does not have a cause of action, given the nature of its broadcast license. I find no reason why, given the F.C.C’s authority to limit spectrum use, it may not also create time limitations on the use of of the spectrums in question. Red Lion’s argument seems to imply that they have a constitutional right to 24 hour control over the content broadcast over their frequency for the duration of their license term. I find no reason to conclude that the license granted by the F.C.C. confers this privilege.

If the broadcast license granted by the F.C.C. granted a complete bundle of rights, then Red Lion would have standing because the government would be forcing them to publish a particular viewpoint. This court held, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, that the freedom of the press was bound by 2 things: a sufficient number of readers, and the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers. Again, in Tornillo, we held that, “The choice of material to go into a newspaper… and treatment of public issues and public official–whether fair or unfair–constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” I see no reason to alter our holdings in either case.
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